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ABSTRACT 
 
A Bayesian belief network (BBN) methodology is proposed for combining evidence to 
better characterize contamination events and reduce false positive sensor detections in drinking 
water distribution systems.  A BBN is developed that integrates sensor data with other validating 
evidence of contamination scenarios.  This network is used to graphically express the causal 
relationships between events such as operational changes or a true contaminant release and 
consequent observable evidence in an example distribution system.  In the BBN methodology 
proposed here, multiple computer simulations of contaminant transport are used to estimate the 
prior probabilities of a positive sensor detection.  These simulations are run over multiple 
combinations of possible source locations and initial mass injections for a conservative solute.  
This approach provides insight into the effect of uncertainties in source mass and location on the 
detection probability of the sensors.  In addition, the simulations identify the upstream nodes that 
are more likely to result in positive detections.  The BBN incorporates the probabilities that 
result from these simulations, and the network is updated to reflect three demonstration scenarios 
– a false positive and two true positive sensor detections. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a great deal of uncertainty in real time characterization of water distribution 
system contamination events.  Much of this uncertainty is due to the lack of targeted sensors, 
which makes it necessary to use surrogate water quality parameters to indirectly measure the 
presence of a contaminant.  A positive sensor detection can often be validated by other pieces of 
evidence observed in a distribution system.  This paper proposes a Bayesian belief network 
(BBN) methodology for integrating evidence associated with a potential contamination event.  
Drinking water utilities face many challenges in recognizing, characterizing, and 
responding to contamination events.  Chief among these is coping with the daunting number of 
dangerous chemical, biological, and radiological substances that may be accidentally or 
purposefully introduced into a drinking water system.  Furthermore, real-time analytical tools for 
characterizing many of these contaminants in-situ do not currently exist, or are prohibitively 
expensive (ASCE, 2004).  As a result, current online contaminant monitoring system design 
makes use of surrogate water quality measures such as total organic carbon (TOC), turbidity, pH, 
chlorine concentration and others which may be correlated to “fingerprint” contamination events 
(ASCE, 2004).   
False positive sensor detections pose an important threat to online contaminant 
monitoring even when sensors with relatively ‘good’ false positive rates are installed.  For 
example, assume that the probability of a contamination event was known a priori to be 0.01%.  
If a sensor with a 0.3% false positive rate were to take 10,000 measurements, it would return 30 
false positives and only 1 true positive.  This problem will occur for any case where the true 
probability of an occurrence is much less than the false positive rate of the sensor.  In reality, the 
true probability of contamination is likely to be much less and the true false positive rates much 
greater than this example (ASCE, 2004). When considered within the context of an entire water 
collection, treatment, and distribution system, it is apparent that there are numerous other system 
events that could obscure or validate such a contaminant detection.  Related pieces of 
information such as physical security alarms, distribution system model topology, and 
contaminant measurements by sensors need to be tied in to expert knowledge of potential 
contamination scenarios.  A BBN is a useful framework for representing the causal relationships 
between events and observations that comprise a contamination scenario.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Bayesian methodologies, such as BBNs used in this project, have been used to combine 
diverse data inputs for numerous applications including battlefield strategy, optical recognition, 
fault detection, advanced driver assistance systems, and sensor network data fusion (Sanzotta and 
Sherrill, 1997; Fox et al., 2003;  Liu and Zhang, 2002; Coue et al., 2003; Karlsson et al., 2002).  
Bayesian networks have been used to fuse data from multiple sensor networks in many 
applications (Bonci et al., 2002; Beckerman, 1992; Brown et al., 1995).  In the energy domain, 
Bayesian modeling methods were used to analyze the distribution of the failure rate at nuclear 
power plants (Chu, 1995).  Schlumberger et al. (2002) used coupled dynamic models with a 
BBN to assess the voltage stability limits for part of France’s subsystem and to identify more 
efficient rules of operation. 
In the battlefield strategy application area, significant research has been conducted to 
apply Bayesian networks and decision trees to support battlefield decision-making.  The 
CoRaven system described by Jones et al. (1998) and Hayes et al. (2000) used a BBN structure 
to make inferences from data observations to a commander’s information requirements.  Franzen 
(1999) modeled the decision structure of battle damage assessment (BDA) within a BBN.  Das et 
al. (2002) presented an approach to battlefield situation assessment based on the real-time 
combination of small Bayesian network components to form a BBN for a specific high-level 
scenario.  Therrien (2002) used a BBN to model human and environmental parameters 
influencing risk assessment and stress in combat scenarios.  Information sources for the BBN 
included observations, training, orders, and reports.   
Substantial research in the Environmental Engineering domain has utilized Bayesian 
approaches for a number of applications, but few studies have used BBNs specifically and none 
have involved applications to water supply protection as illustrated here. In groundwater 
remediation, BBNs coupling an expert knowledge base with process models have been used to 
evaluate the potential of naturally occurring reductive dechlorination at sites contaminated with 
TCE (Stiber et al., 1999, 2004a, 2004b).  Marcot (2001) combined expert knowledge with 
ecological data in a BBN to model the causal relationships between planning decisions and 
impacts on at-risk wildlife species habitats.  Stow et al. (2003) compared a BBN approach with 
two deterministic models for predicting the effect of nitrogen loading on estuarine chlorophyll a 
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concentrations.  Murray et al. (2005) predicted health risks associated with a contamination event 
using a dynamic disease model linked with a distribution system flow and transport model.     
In the field of drinking water supply, several researchers have focused on characterizing 
intentional contamination of distribution systems, but not with Bayesian methodologies.  Nilsson 
et al. (2005) simulated the exposure of a population to a deliberate contamination attack using a 
Monte Carlo approach over a wide range of uncertain demands and operation scenarios.  
Allmann and Carlson (2005) analyzed the intentional introduction, spread and detection of 
several known contaminants in a distribution system.  Others including Lee and Deininger 
(1992), Kessler et al. (1998), and Ostfeld (2004), have sought to optimize the placement of water 
monitoring stations in distribution systems.      
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Our research seeks to use BBNs to integrate sensors and other relevant data to better 
characterize a system for real-time response.  This task is similar to military and studies in other 
fields that utilize Bayesian approaches to combine diverse sources of data and intelligence in a 
battlefield setting or other response scenario.  This paper presents a BBN approach that 
integrates information from multiple sensors with records of operational changes.  The approach 
is implemented on a hypothetical case study.  Simulations over numerous possible combinations 
of upstream locations and source mass values are used to estimate the probability of a detection 
given that a contaminant release has occurred.  This probability along with others estimated by 
expert judgment define the variables that comprise the BBN.    The following sections present an 
introduction to Bayesian belief networks, a description of the hypothetical case study, a 
methodology for implementing the BBN, and a demonstration using the BBN to infer knowledge 
of the system state for three positive sensor detection scenarios.  
 
Bayesian Belief Networks 
 
Bayes theorem states that: 
)(
)()|()|(
DP
hPhDPDhP =     (1) 
where:   
P(h)  = prior probability of h with no knowledge of observation D, 
P(D)  = prior probability of D with no knowledge of h, 
P(h|D)  = posterior probability of h after observation D, and     
 P(D|h) = probability of observation D given that h is true. 
 The Bayesian prior probability P(h) is updated to a posterior probability P(h|D) that 
reflects an observation D.  Conceptually, this updating process mimics the reasoning of people 
presented with new information about uncertain phenomena.  For a classic illustration of this 
idea, presented in The Economist (September, 2000), consider a newborn infant in her first day.  
After observing her first sunset, she wishes to determine the probability that the sun will rise 
again using Bayes theorem.  The infant puts a black marble and a white marble into a bag to 
5 
 
represent her initial estimate that there is an equal probability that the sun will rise again or not.  
Each day that the sun rises, she puts another white marble into the bag.  After one morning, the 
probability of sunrise increases from 0.5 (1 white marble/2 total marbles) to 0.75 (2 white 
marbles/3 total marbles).  The probability is 0.8 after the second day, 0.833 after the third, and so 
on until the child has near certainty that the sun will continue to rise every day.  In much the 
same way, the prior probability of a hypothesis, P(h) is revised to a posterior probability after an 
observation has been made P(h|D). 
Bayesian learning in a complex, interconnected system can be represented with a BBN, 
which represents the conditional independence assumptions among a set of variables, thus 
specifying the joint probability distribution.  A BBN is typically presented as a directed acyclic 
graph with nodes representing variables and arcs representing assertions of conditional 
independence.  A node is conditionally independent of its non-descendants.  In Figure 1, variable 
d can be said to be conditionally independent of variable c, given a and b.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Bayesian belief network structure 
 
Bayes theorem defines the relationships among variables.  The joint probability for the 
assignment of any set of values (x1,…,xn) to the set of variables (X1,…,Xn) in a BBN can be 
determined by: 
∏
=
=
n
i
iin XParentsxPxxP
1
1 ))(|(),...,(    (2) 
where, Parents(Xi) is the set of values for preceding nodes in the network.  The joint probability 
of any set of variables can be inferred from observed values or distributions for any subset of 
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remaining variables.  There are a number of exact and approximate algorithms that have been 
developed to infer posterior probabilities for BBNs (Jenson, 1996).  The work presented in this 
study utilizes a generalized variable elimination approach in which posteriors are derived from 
the marginal probabilities for a set of variables in the BBN.  Further details on this algorithm are 
provided by Cozman (2000) and Dechter (1999). 
 A powerful attribute of BBNs is their ability to integrate expert knowledge with models 
and data to define both the conditional independence structure between variables and the 
associated probabilities.  The BBN can then be recursively updated as new evidence becomes 
available, in much the same way that the newborn infant adds additional white marbles to her 
bag as she observes each sunrise.  The BBN presented in this study utilizes expert knowledge to 
determine the network structure.  Prior probabilities were determined using modeling for some 
nodes and expert judgment for others. 
Application of BBNs to a Distribution System Case Study 
 
 In this section, a BBN methodology is proposed to represent a distribution system and 
possible pieces of evidence that might be available to inform a system operator in the event of a 
contamination event.  Evidence includes sensors and operational records.  The contaminant 
release is assumed to occur from a single location at a service connection, hydrant, storage tank, 
or other water infrastructure component. The approach is general and should be readily adaptable 
to other types of scenarios and distribution systems. 
 The distribution system used in this study is a hypothetical campus-type facility that was 
created for research, development, and demonstration purposes only.  The relevant water 
infrastructure components are extracted from GIS data for the model facility.  The distribution 
system is modeled with 235 nodes and 261 pipes ranging from 5.08 cm (2 in) to 30.48 cm (12 in) 
in diameter.  Water demands are assigned to nodes based on typical per capita consumption 
values in the assortment of buildings that are present in the model facility.  Figure 2 shows the 
demand patterns used in the model.  Pipes, pumps, and storage facilities are sized and configured 
so that water pressures are between 276 kPa (40 psi) and 552 kPa (80 psi) and water velocities 
are less than 1.53 m/sec (5 ft/sec).  EPANET (Rossman, 2000) is used to solve the distribution 
system flow and transport equations.       
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Figure 2.  Demand patterns used in distribution system model 
 
Three sensor locations were identified based on a qualitative inspection of the model flow 
patterns in extended time period hydraulic simulations.  Figure 3 shows a schematic of the 
distribution system model and the sensor locations.  These locations were selected from within a 
limited region of the distribution system to reduce complexity of the analysis.  An attempt was 
made to maximize the sensor’s upstream coverage, and distribute sensors evenly across the target 
area, however, no rigorous mathematical optimization was performed.  Others have conducted 
research into algorithms to determine the optimal placement of sensors (e.g., Lee and Deininger, 
1992; Kessler et al., 1998; Ostfeld and Salomons, 2004), which is a topic beyond the scope of 
this study.    
 
Figure 3.  Distribution system model showing location of treatment plant and sensors 
Industrial 
Domestic 
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Each sensor was assumed to be capable of identifying contaminants from the region of 
the distribution system upstream of the sensor’s location.  The upstream region of each sensor 
was determined by simulating the release of a unit contaminant from each node in the system and 
observing which source nodes resulted in non-zero detections at the sensors.  Four mutually 
exclusive upstream areas were defined by the overlapping coverages of the downstream sensors.  
Area 1 is upstream of all three sensors, Area 2 is upstream of Sensor A and Sensor C, Area 3 is 
upstream of Sensor B and Sensor C, and Area 4 is only upstream of Sensor C (Figure 4).  
Sensors A and B are upstream of Sensor C and completely contained in its coverage area.  
Therefore there are no areas defined to be exclusively upstream of A or B but not C.  Sensors 
were assumed to provide a simple yes/no indication of the presence of a contaminant above a 
threshold concentration with known false positive and false negative rates.  These sensors could 
be devices that measure the contaminant directly, or they could measure a surrogate parameter 
that is then related to the contaminant through postprocessing using a statistical relationship, 
learning algorithm (e.g. artificial neural network), clustering, or other method (ASCE, 2004).  
Surrogate water quality parameters are not included in this analysis, however, they could easily 
be integrated into a BBN as additional evidence nodes. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Distribution system showing locations of sensors and upstream areas 
 
 A BBN representing the joint probabilities of several contamination scenarios is shown in 
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Figure 5.  The bottom level nodes of the BBN represent observable evidence such as that 
provided by sensors and operational logs.  Top-level nodes represent causal events that are not 
directly observable.  Some of the top nodes are ‘true positive’ events such as a contaminant 
release in an upstream area, while some would be ‘false positives’ such as a change in operation.  
The origin of the contaminant release is not specified and could be intentional or unintentional.  
These are simplifications and abstractions of the relevant components that might exist in an 
actual distribution system.  It is expected that the ‘operation change’ node would be subdivided 
into many individual nodes that each represents the state of a system component such as pumps 
or storage tanks.  Additional observable evidence such as specific threat intelligence could easily 
be incorporated into the BBN through additional nodes.  The structure of the BBN is defined by 
the topology of the distribution system – events upstream cause observable evidence 
downstream.  Additional structural elements such as physical security evidence, power grid 
events, hospital diagnosis patterns, and others could be integrated using expert knowledge of 
causal relationships between events and evidence.   
 
 
Figure 5.  Bayesian belief network for distribution system contamination 
 
Each node of the BBN utilizes a table containing conditional probabilities of discrete 
Boolean states given the state of that node’s parents, or P(xi | Parents(Xi)).  For top level nodes, 
this table is simply the prior probability of that event, P(xi) and the prior probability of not that 
event, P(¬xi).  Table 1 shows the matrix of conditional probabilities estimated for Sensor B given 
the state of its parent nodes: Contaminant from Area 1, Contaminant from Area 3, and Operation 
Contaminant  
from Area 1 
 
Contaminant  
from Area 3 
 
Contaminant  
from Area 2 
 
Operation  
change 
 
Sensor A 
 
Sensor B 
 
Sensor C 
 
Operation 
record 
 
 
Causal  
Events 
Observable  
Evidence 
Contaminant  
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change.  Contaminant from Area 1 refers to the introduction of a contaminant into the region that 
is upstream of all three sensors,and Contaminant from Area 3 refers to the introduction of a 
contaminant into the region that is covered by Sensor B and Sensor C (Figure 4).  Operation 
change refers to actions such as system flushing, booster pump activation, valve maintenance, 
seasonal changes, or others that might cause false sensor detections.  This node could be 
subdivided and refined during implementation to reflect further knowledge of system operational 
characteristics.  The relevant operational activities would be dependent on a specific system’s 
hydraulic characteristics and the sensor technology used.  The number of combinations of parent 
node states is 2i, where i = number of parent nodes.  For the case of Sensor B there are 8 possible 
combinations of parent states. It is not possible for both Contaminant from Area 1 and 
Contaminant from Area 3  to be ‘true’ since we assume a single injection scenario.      
The prior probabilities for each variable in the network may be determined in a number 
of ways.  False positive and false negative rates for the sensor due to internal causes may be 
provided by the manufacturer or determined during project implementation.  For this study, the 
false positive and false negative rates for the sensors are assumed to be 0.05 and 0.03, 
respectively.  The prior probability of a contaminant release may be somewhat more difficult to 
rationally estimate.  In contrast to rare natural phenomena such as severe weather events, 
intentional terrorist attacks are not random events with a historical record on which to base a 
frequency analysis.  Priors for unintentional contamination events, however, may be estimated 
based on the historical record, expectation of infrastructure failures, or other inputs.  For this 
study, the prior probability of a contaminant release is arbitrarily assumed to be 0.0001.  The 
prior probability of Operation change was also assumed to be 0.0001.  For a real application, it 
may be possible to determine the prior probabilities for operational changes represented in the 
BBN from analysis of historical data.      
The conditional prior probabilities for observable nodes given the state of parent nodes 
can be determined by computer simulation.  In this study, the prior probabilities of detection by 
the sensors given an upstream release are estimated using repeated simulations with EPANET.  
The contaminant is modeled as the single injection of a pure conservative solute for six hours 
using the mass booster option in EPANET.  This release is simulated from all possible source 
locations in each of the upstream areas covered by the sensor, and the initial mass is varied from 
0 to 300 g/min in 0.25 g/min increments.  The upper limit reflects practical considerations for a 
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likely intentional terrorist attack.  The amount of contaminant that could be concealed at a 
residential location and the capacity of a 1.905 cm (3/4 in) service connection would likely 
preclude larger initial mass values.  An injection of 300 g/min over 6 hr would require a mass of 
approximately 108 kg of pure solute.  We assume a single release scenario, so multiple injections 
were not simulated.     
The solute concentration is measured at the sensors over the 36-hour simulation period 
for each combination of source mass and location.  This duration was chosen to ensure that the 
simulation would capture the peak concentration at each sensor.  A positive detection is assumed 
to have occurred if the sensor concentration exceeds an arbitrarily selected threshold of 100 
mg/L. The prior conditional probability of a sensor detection is determined by, 
tot
ettotetet
n
nnFPnFNn
releasepositiveP )()()|( −+−=   (3) 
where, net is the number of simulations that result in a concentration exceeding the threshold for 
a single sensor, FN is the false negative rate, FP is the false positive rate, and ntot is the total 
number of releases from the upstream area over all locations and initial mass values.  The 
conditional prior probabilities for operation change variables, such as  
P(Operation record | Operation change) or P(Sensor B | Operation change), are assumed in this 
study.  However, these conditional priors could be reasonably estimated by analysis of historical 
records or additional simulations.  The value of P(Sensor A | Operation change) is estimated to 
be 0.7, P(Sensor C | Operation change) is 0.05, and P(Sensor B | Operation change) is 0.05.  
These conditional prior probabilities were set to different values to reflect a closer relationship 
between Operation change and Sensor A than the other sensors.  This introduces an additional 
complexity to the BBN similar to that likely to occur in a real world application.  The conditional 
prior probabilities for combinations of Operation change with other parent nodes are determined 
by calculating the union of the individual probabilities, since the individual probabilities are 
mutually exclusive.  For example, P(Sensor B | Contaminant from Area 1, Operation change) is 
simply P(Sensor B | Contaminant from Area 1) OR  P(Sensor B | Operation change). Table 1 
shows the conditional prior probabilities for Sensor B. 
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Table 1:  Matrix of prior conditional probabilities for Sensor B and its parent nodes 
 Parent node states Probability of detection 
Contaminant from Area 1 Contaminant from Area 3 Operation Change Sensor B 
Positive 
Sensor B 
Negative 
True False True 0.522 0.478 
True False False 0.497 0.503 
False True True 0.973 0.0266 
False True False 0.972 0.0280 
False False True 0.0965 0.9035 
False False False 0.0500 0.950 
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RESULTS 
 
The BBN is used to explore hypothetical combinations of sensor detections and other 
evidence that might occur in a contamination event.  The posterior probability that a contaminant 
has been introduced is inferred from changes to observable nodes in the BBN.  When a node is 
‘observed’, its value becomes fixed, and the probability of that node’s parent(s) is inferred to 
reflect the new observation.  The posterior probabilities of the causal event nodes can provide 
useful guidance for interpreting a positive sensor detection.  Because prior probabilities are set to 
an arbitrarily low value (0.0001) for the causal event nodes, the change in probability is used to 
indicate causality.  Three possible scenarios are explored for illustration purposes below:  a false 
positive and two true positive detections.   
In the first example, Operation record  is observed to be ‘true’, Sensor A is observed to 
be ‘true’, Sensor B is observed to be ‘false’, and Sensor C is observed to be ‘false’.  The 
probability of the positive sensor detection being caused by Contaminant from Area 2 is updated 
from a prior of 0.0001 to a posterior of 0.00047 (Figure 6).   
 
 
Figure 6.  Example of BBN updating for a false positive sensor detection 
 
The probabilities of releases in the two other upstream areas also increase slightly.  However, the 
probability that the positive sensor detection was caused by Operation change is updated from a 
prior of 0.0001 to a posterior of 0.0394.  This posterior value is quite small due to the effect of 
the very low prior probability that was assigned to this node.  However, the probability for 
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Operation change increased by a factor of 394 from its prior value, which is a much greater 
increase than other causal nodes.  Taking the change in probabilities into account, this result 
suggests that the sensor detection is a false positive.         
In the second example, Operation record  is observed to be ‘false’, Sensor A is observed 
to be ‘true’, Sensor B is observed to be ‘false’, and Sensor C is observed to be ‘true’.  The 
probability of Contaminant from Area 2 is updated from a prior of 0.0001 to a posterior of 
0.0201, an increase by a factor of 201 (Figure 7).  The probability of Operation record decreases 
for this scenario from 0.0001 to 7.76 x 10-5.  This result suggests that the sensor detection is a 
true positive. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Example of BBN updating for a true positive sensor detection 
 
The change in probability is used to suggest causality where priors are set to an arbitrarily 
low value.  An analysis was performed to determine the sensitivity of this change to different 
prior probabilities.  When the prior for Contaminant from Area 2  is changed from 0.0001 to 
0.001, the resulting posterior for the true positive scenario is 0.175, an increase by a factor of 
175.  Further trials with different prior probabilities for this variable result in a relatively 
consistent increase in the posterior when the prior is 0.001 or less.  Figure 8 shows the factor by 
which the posterior increases in this sensor detection scenario for different prior probabilities of 
Contaminant from Area 2.   This result suggests that the change in probability is insensitive to 
the initial value for rare events.      
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Figure 8.  Factor by which the probability of Contaminant from Area 2 increases in the true 
positive scenario for different prior probabilities   
 
The final example shows a less intuitive combination of evidence in which two sensors 
are positive and an operation change has occurred.  Sensor A is observed to be ‘false’, Sensor B 
is ‘true’, Sensor C is ‘true’, and Operation record is ‘true’.  The posterior probability for 
Operation change in this case is 0.00367, a change by a factor of 36.7.  The posterior for 
Contaminant from Area 2 is 0.0343, an increase by a factor of 343.  While somewhat less 
conclusive than the other examples, this combination of evidence clearly implicates Contaminant 
from Area 2 as the most likely source of a true positive detection.  This result is reasonable since 
Operation change is more closely related to Sensor A with a higher conditional probability than 
the other two sensors. 
The methodology proposed in the previous sections also provides insight into the 
probability that a contaminant released at a given node would be detected by a downstream 
sensor.  The probability for each upstream node was determined using summing positive 
detections by a sensor over all initial mass values while keeping location constant.  This 
information would be useful in identifying the location of a contaminant release in response to a 
positive sensor detection.  Figure 9 shows the estimated probability of contaminant detection at 
Sensor C for releases at each upstream location.  In this case the probabilities for each upstream 
location are all relatively high.  It is likely that a model of a contaminant in a more complex full-
scale system would result in a larger range of probability values. 
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Figure 9.  Estimated probability of contaminant detection at Sensor C for releases at 
     each location 
 
 
Sensor C 
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DISCUSSION 
 
This work suggests that BBNs have the potential to be a useful tool for interpreting the 
sometimes confusing information from online contaminant monitoring and other sources that 
characterize a water system.  However, there are additional challenges that require further 
research.  The spatial and temporal characteristics of the sensor data and distribution system 
model are not directly expressed in the BBN presented here.  This approach does not, for 
example, provide information regarding the exact location within an upstream region that a 
contaminant was released.  Others such as Shang et al. (2002) and Zierolf et al. (1998) have 
presented more rigorous mathmatical approaches for particle backtracking that utilize timing 
information to link output to source input.  It is possible that the location probability map shown 
in Figure 9 could be further refined in a real-time response scenario by accounting for the time 
difference between sensor detections.  The timing of these observations could be used with real 
time flow data to pinpoint the location of an attack.  Figure 9 is also beneficial in that it identifies 
nodes that are not well covered by the sensor network.  This information could be useful for 
network planning purposes.   
Timing would also be relevant to the probability that observations are evidence of the 
same causal event.  In addition, only contamination from a single ideal source is represented in 
the BBN demonstrated here.  Further research is needed to extend this work beyond these 
simplifying assumptions to additional contamination scenarios, additional reactive solutes, larger 
and more complex distribution systems, and additional case studies.  Future work will also 
explore the use of simulated data streams to update the Bayesian network in real time.    
Very little computational time was required to solve the Bayesian belief network once the 
prior probabilities were defined. The contaminant simulation to calculate prior probabilities 
required approximately 80,000 runs, which took 2.5 hours to complete using a Windows desktop 
PC.  Future implementations of this method could easily make use of a parallel computing 
cluster to reduce the computational time. 
The BBN presented here is used as a framework for expressing the complex causal 
relationships and conditional probabilities that comprise contamination scenarios.  A challenge in 
implementing this approach would be to imagine contamination scenarios that cover the wide 
range of possible vulnerabilities.  These scenarios would ideally be the product of a diverse 
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group of experts, engineers, operators, responders, and others that have detailed knowledge of 
the system and current research in vulnerability analysis.  However, the possibility would always 
exist that a terrorist could attack a water system in an unpredictable way that would not be 
characterized accurately by the BBN.  During implementation, observed evidence would likely 
be augmented by data from field testing kits that could be deployed to a region of the distribution 
system.  The evidence from these tests could be integrated into the BBN simply by adding 
additional observation nodes.       
An approach for estimating some of the prior probabilities is shown in this study.  
However, there are additional variables for which probabilities must either be determined 
through expert judgment, regression, or additional modeling.  The BBN presented here is 
intended to be a framework for expressing the conditional relationships between system variables 
and making inferences in response to observations.  It is expected that any implemented BBN 
would be refined and augmented by real time data to define both probabilities and network 
structure.   Mining these relationships and patterns in real time data is an area of active research 
that will likely complement the work presented here.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This study proposes a BBN methodology for expressing complex causal relationships 
among the events and observations that comprise contamination scenarios in water distribution 
systems.  These scenarios can be better understood when explicitly visualized in a graphical 
probabilistic model such as a BBN.  The methodology uses distribution system simulations to 
estimate conditional prior probabilities for contaminant introductions.  Application of the 
approach to a hypothetical system illustrated how data from sensors and other sources can be 
interpreted with a BBN to better characterize a water system and distinguish between a routine 
false positive sensor detection and a true system contamination event.  This approach has the 
potential to be incorporated into both security planning and real time response actions.    
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